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Abstract
In an effort to proactively examine NextGen concepts to identify and mitigate potential human performance risks and system-
level contributing factors, the proactive Human-Organization Safety Technique (HOST) was developed. Building upon human 
factors and systems engineering theories, HOST combines the Human Error Safety Risks Assessment (HESRA) methodology 
with the Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to provide stakeholders with a comprehensive view of potential safety 
risks. Through the application of HOST, human and system performance hazards and their impacts are identified. Utilizing 
systems engineering processes and human-system interaction models, the ramifications of those hazards are traced beyond the 
immediate hazard actor impact to identify other system and actor impacts. HOST provides a structured methodology for 
assessing and prioritizing human and system performance hazards based on severity, likelihood, and detection/recovery. The 
consistent structure underlying the human-system interaction models further enables the identification of key safety interaction 
points and integration hazards associated with multiple related concepts. The resulting prioritized identification of potential 
human and system performance hazards allows for mitigation strategies to be developed and targeted towards the highest priority 
hazards.
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1. Introduction
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is currently executing a considerable transformation of the National 
Airspace System. The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) aims to improve the convenience and 
dependability of air travel while increasing safety and reducing environmental impact. NextGen plans to meet these 
goals by introducing a variety of new aviation systems and capabilities [1]. While NextGen may produce many 
positive safety improvements, the introduction of each new system and capability also offers the possibility of
increasing the human contribution to risk in the NAS. This is especially true when considering the system-wide 
impact and concurrent development of many of the systems [2]. From a risk management perspective, research into 
these effects is needed to address the potential for both positive and negative impacts on the safety of the NAS [3]. 
Proactive human factors integration into the design and safety process will not only reduce industry cost, but also 
will also improve system design, development, and implementation and improve system safety [4]. A standardized 
approach to proactively identifying and assessing human error modes is needed to ensure these hazards are 
identified, described, and tracked. Furthermore, this need is not limited to NextGen changes, but can be applied to 
any change to the NAS or any other similar domains which rely on the human operator to manage complex 
automation systems.
The Human and Organizational Safety Technique (HOST) method bridges the gap between system safety and 
human factors by combing the leading methods from each domain.HOST is designed to examine a new proposed 
system or tool with the goal of improving human performance during the design stages by mitigating opportunities 
for human error. Human error in complex systems is rarely the result of a single error, but is rather the result of the 
combined impacts of multiple factors and natural performance variability. Complex systems with multiple actors 
and systems working together therefore require analysis that promotes an integrated view of the proposed concepts. 
1.1. Purpose
Understanding the potential impact of proposed NextGen changes is critical to ensuring implemented systems 
positively support human performance of actors in the NAS. Given the concurrent nature of NextGen capability 
development along with the inter-related nature of many capabilities, a new technique was needed to 
comprehensively explore the impact of these changes on human performance. This paper presents the development 
and a sample application of a technique designed to support the development of NextGen capabilities that support 
human performance.
2. Development of Human and Organizational Safety Technique – HOST
The development of HOST was based primarily on two methods representing human performance and system 
safety.  The Human Error Safety Risk Assessment (HESRA) identifies and prioritizes potential human error modes 
associated with proposed concepts [5].  The System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a systems view of 
safety that incorporates the many factors organizational factors impacting system safety [6]. Further detail on each 
method and the integration of the two methods is described below.
2.1. Human Error Safety Risk Assessment – HESRA
HESRA is a method for systematically identifying human performance in a new, changing, or existing system or 
process. HESRA is neither the only, nor the most comprehensive technique that has been developed and applied in 
the air traffic control domain. However, it is a method that has been shown to be workable, applicable, and effective 
in identifying and mitigating the conditions that are likely to increase human errors. HESRA’s goal is to identify 
elements of process or system design in which introduce the possibility of human error occurring. It is designed to 
be implemented during the early stages of concept design, before design concepts have been fully designed. Based 
on failure modes and effects analysis, HESRA is utilized to decompose systems or procedures from the perspective 
of the human component and then to identify the likely human error modes at each stage of a process or system. The 
result of HESRA is a listing of potential hazards along with qualitative estimates of severity, likelihood, and 
764   Michael W. Sawyer and Katherine A. Berry /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  762 – 768 
detection/recovery. The HESRA methodology is primarily focused on the human and does not wholly examine the 
system impacts of a proposed change.
2.2. System Theoretic Process Analysis—STPA 
The STPA methodology is a systems safety engineering approached used to proactively identify safety hazards 
for a system. It draws upon the underlying model in the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP). Based in systems engineering, STAMP relies on three basic constructs – safety constraints, hierarchical 
safety control structures, and, process models – and approaches systems as dynamic processes that continuously 
adapt [6]. STPA identified hazards and safety constraints by developing control structures and examining various 
unsafe control actions. STPA then develops safety constraints to ensure that unsafe control actions are not executed. 
The human factors portion of STPA treats the human component of the system in the same manner as software and 
mechanical components and does not thoroughly examine the unique nuances of human performance.
2.3. HOST method
The HOST method combines elements of HESRA and STPA to allow for human performance risks to be 
identified and prioritized based on their system impacts. The identification of human error modes is driven by both 
control structures and tasks analyses. The human error modes are assessed and prioritized based upon their system 
impacts. Figure 4 outlines the HOST process steps. 
Develop Task Analysis & Human System Interaction Model. The goal of this step is to detail system or process
being assessed to understand the components of the system and the tasks needed for successful use of the system or 
process. This step produces a high-level task analysis outlining the tasks impacted by the proposed change, and a
Human System Interaction Model(HSIM) that outlines the impacted human-system interactions.
Identify Unsafe Interactions. The goal of step two is to identify the potential unsafe actions resulting from each 
interaction in the developed HSIM.This step produces a list of potential unsafe actions based off each HSIM 
interaction point.
Define Human Performance Hazards & Outcomes. The goal of the third step is to identify potential outcomes of 
each unsafe interaction. This step produces the most probable and worst credible outcomes associated with each 
unsafe interaction. In addition to the hazard outcomes, additional data such as the actors and tasks associated with 
each hazard and recovery mechanism are identified.
Fig.1. HOST process.
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Assess Human Performance Hazards. The goal of this step is to assess the severity of the worst credible outcome, 
the likelihood of reaching that outcome, and the ability of the human operator to detect and recovery from the 
hazard.
Prioritize Human Performance Hazards. The goal of step four is to utilize the severity, likelihood, and recovery 
ratings to prioritize the identified human performance hazards. These features can weighted during the prioritization 
to reflect systems where likelihood may be more difficult to estimate.
Develop Mitigation Strategies. This step produces mitigation strategies based on the prioritized hazards 
developed in the previous steps. The HSIM and other data defined during the assessment are used to target 
mitigations at the likely causes and related systems and actors.
A full list of data collection elements and there definitions are provided in Table 1.
Table 1.HESRA Data Elements and Definitions.
Term Definition
Hazard Condition Any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment
Human Performance Hazard Potential action or inaction carried out by an actor in response to a hazard condition which could lead to an adverse outcome
Worst Credible Outcome Worst credible outcome of the human error mode if it occurs in response to the defined hazard condition
Severity An estimate of the level of adversity of the worst credible outcome and its impacts
Likelihood An estimate of how often the human error mode leads to the worst credible outcome
Detection/Recovery An estimate of ability to detect or identify the hazard has occurred combined with an estimate of the ability to recover or return to a safe state
Risk Priority Number HESRA rating of composite risk of a hazard based on severity, likelihood, and recovery ratings
SMS Risk Matrix Category SMS categorization of risk associated with each hazard based on the severity and likelihood of the outcome
Effect Type Classification of worst credible outcome either having primarily safety, workload, or efficiency effects
Hazard Actor NAS actor whose actions or inaction caused the human error mode to occur
Outcome Actor NAS actor whose actions aided in detecting and recovering from the hazard and its effects
Impacted tasks The AIR task, sub-activity, and activity associated with the hazard
3. Example application: Interval Management-Spacing
The FAA is currently executing a considerable transformation of the NAS. NextGen aims to improve the 
convenience and dependability of air travel while increasing safety and reducing environmental impacts. NextGen 
plans to meet these goals by introducing a variety of new systems and capabilities [7]. One proposed NextGen 
change described in the NAS Enterprise Architecture is the concept of Interval Management-Spacing [8]. 
Operational Improvement 102118: Interval Management describes a new procedure under which the position of an 
aircraft in a traffic flow is management in relation to the position of one or more aircraft [8]. In other words, 
controllers may instruct flight crews to maintain a specific distance from the aircraft in front of them during cruise 
operation. The flight crew would then manage the aircraft performance to maintain this interval. 
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3.1. Task analysis and HSIM
A panel of subject matter experts representing commercial aviation, air traffic control, and human factors utilized 
the FAA description of the Interval Management-Spacing OI to develop a list of potential tasks necessary to 
implement this concept. An excerpt of the task analysis is included below in Table 2. These tasks were then utilized 
to develop the HSIM for Interval Management-Space provided below in Figure 2.
Table 2. Excerpt of Impacted Tasks Associated with the execution of Interval-Management Spacing.
Step Interaction Task Description
1a EN1A:EN11 ARTCC IM-S Automation identifies eligible aircraft pair and provides status of IM-S spacing pairs
1b EN11:EN1A En Route controller enters IM-S clearance into automation and monitors IM-S spacing using automation
2a EN11:AL12 En Route controller issues IM-S clearance to trailing aircraft flight crew
2b AL12:EN11 Trailing flight crew accepts or rejects IM-S clearance
4a AL12:AL1B Trailing flight crew inputs IM-S clearance into aircraft automation
4b AL1B:AL12 Aircraft automation provides flight crew with status of IM-S spacing
6a AL1A:AL1B  AL1B:AL1A Aircraft position information is shared between paired aircraft
7a AL1A:AL21 Aircraft automation provides control inputs to trailing Aircraft to maintain spacing
7b AL21:AL1A Trailing Aircraft provides feedback to aircraft automation
767 Michael W. Sawyer and Katherine A. Berry /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  762 – 768 
Fig.2. HSIM for OI 102118: Interval Management-Spacing.
3.2. Identified human performance hazards
The developed task analysis and HSIM were then utilized to identify potential unsafe interactions present at each 
interaction point in the HSIM. The result revealed a series of potential human performance hazards that a controller 
or pilot might face while executing this capability. A selection of potential human performance hazards introduced 
with this OI are provided below in Table 3.
Table 3. Excerpt of potential human performance hazards.
Hazard ID Impacted Task
Human Performance 
Hazard Worst Credible Outcome
Human Factors 
Priority
01
Leading flight crew 
accepts or rejects 
IM-S clearance from 
En Route Controller
IM-S automation identifies 
ineligible pairing as eligible
Lead aircraft is not equipped for IM-S. 
Controller issues instructions to trailing 
aircraft. Trailing aircraft is unable to 
initiate IM-S clearance and informs 
controller.
Low
03
En Route controller 
approves or denies 
lateral deviation 
request from the 
Trailing Flight Crew
Sector controller issues IM-
S Cruise clearance to 
trailing aircraft via voice. 
Controller misspeaks 
clearance.
IM-S Cruise clearance is inadequate for 
separation minima. Potential for loss of 
separation. Conflict alert notifies 
controller of potential LOS. Controller 
tactically manages traffic.
Moderate
05
Trailing Flight Crew 
inputs IM-S
clearance into
Aircraft Automation
Trailing aircraft flight crew 
accepts IM-S Cruise 
clearance via voice and 
incorrectly updates the 
aircraft FIM automation 
and/or experiences a flight 
path error due to an 
incorrect automation 
setting.
Aircraft flight path performance is
inadequate for separation minima. 
Potential for loss of separation. Conflict 
alert notifies controller of potential 
LOS. Controller tactically manages 
traffic.
Moderate
EN11 – En Route 
Sector Controller
AL1B – Aircraft 
Automation
AL22 – Aircraft
AL1A – Aircraft 
Automation
AL21 – Aircraft
2d. Lateral 
Clearance 
Request
3a. IM-S 
Clearance
3b. Accept / 
Reject
2c. Lateral 
Clearance
Approve /
Deny
5a. IM-S 
Clearance 5b. Feedback
8a. Control 8b. Feedback
9a. Surveillance
1b. IM-S Identification, 
Initiation, Spacing1a. Monitor,
Enter Clearance
6a. Aircraft 
Position
7a. Control 7b. Feedback
4a. Input 
IM-S Clearance 4b. Feedback
4c. Input 
Lateral 
Clearance
4d. Feedback
EN1A – En Route 
Automation
AL12 – Flight Crew
Leading 
AL11 – Flight Crew
Trailing 
2a. IM-S 
Clearance
2b. Accept /
 Reject
Primary – ERAM
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4. Conclusion
The proactive Human-Organization Safety Technique (HOST) was developed in an effort to proactively examine 
NextGen concepts to identify and mitigate potential human performance risks and system-level contributing factors. 
HOST combinedhuman factors and system safety tools to provide stakeholders with a comprehensive view of 
potential safety risks. Through the application of HOST, human and system performance hazards and their impacts 
are identified. The HSIM models allow for the impacts of those hazards to be traced beyond the immediate hazard 
actor impact to identify other system and actor impacts. HOST provides a structured methodology for assessing and 
prioritizing human and system performance hazards based on severity, likelihood, and detection/recovery. The 
consistent structure underlying the human-system interaction models further enables the identification of key safety 
interaction points and integration hazards associated with multiple related concepts. The resulting prioritized 
identification of potential human and system performance hazards allows for mitigation strategies to be developed 
and targeted towards the highest priority hazards.
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